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Abstract
Many states and cities find themselves facing several serious long‐term public
infrastructure challenges due to rising maintenance costs. Infrastructure funding gaps arose
from an inefficient approach to public infrastructure development and operation. States and
local governments were faced with unfunded pension obligations and as a solution, they
diverted tax revenues away from the maintenance and growth of infrastructure. The 2008
economic recession occurred and compounded these problems. Budget studies indicated that
states needed new policies and strategies to slow down the pace of spending on infrastructure
maintenance as the recession started to subside, further exacerbating the infrastructure
funding gap.1
This paper addresses the gap in infrastructure funding needs by identifying the essential
role that public‐private partnerships (P3) are now taking in infrastructure facilities that are open
to the public for use along with examining opportunities and challenges for this transformative
shift in the field. Contextualizing the need of P3 programs within recent developments and
tracing the expansion of public‐private partnerships in selected cities both successfully
implemented, and failures is considered. In each city highlighted, I discuss the mutual
advantages of a public‐private partnership while also illustrating challenges that both public
and private entities encountered as they worked to develop and implement the program.
Dynamics of the balancing act between the state and local government and private
entities in decision making required by public officials when weighing the costs and benefits of

1

Weller, C., Estep, S., & Hendricks, G. (2019 April 2). Budgeting the Future. American Progress.
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accepting private donations is also considered. The paper also discusses the infrastructure
funding along with a development approach that minimizes the need for new taxes. A
conclusion is reached by discussing the ongoing challenges that need to be considered and
addressed for public‐private partnerships to be successful over the long term along with the
risks and benefits of having such an agreement.

Introduction
The P3
There is widespread consensus that infrastructure across the United States is in urgent
need of investment, replacement, and renewal.2 It would take significant investment to repair
the nation’s highways, water treatment systems, schools, bridges, and transit infrastructure.
From 2016 to 2025, the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) estimate an
underinvestment in our infrastructure by $2 trillion.3 The upfront costs are prohibitive for many
cities and states.
A public‐private partnership (P3) can bring the financing component and
expertise/innovation that adds value to the infrastructure. The public‐private partnership, or
P3, is a long‐term agreement between a public entity and a private entity that is tasked with
funding, developing, and execution of projects serving the populations’ needs. In this
arrangement, the public partner gives the private partner the exclusive right and compensation
to engage in an activity that would otherwise be a public responsibility. P3s have been used to
develop public services and infrastructure like roads and bridges, water treatment plants,

2
3

Poole Jr., R. & Stuart, A. (2017 January). Federal Barriers to Private Capital Investment in U.S. Infrastructure.
American Society of Civil Engineers. 2017 ASCE Infrastructure Report Card.
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wastewater facilities, courthouses, hospitals, and educational institutions including K‐12 and
universities. Infrastructure targets can be accomplished through the P3 for governments and
resolve deficiencies arising from economic downturns.
State and local governments can take on projects they might not have otherwise been
able to pursue when teamed up with a private entity. The P3 can be an alternative to providing
services in an efficient manner, while avoiding the need for borrowing to sustain operations. In
this model, transfer of capital investment obligations or services are transferred from the public
to the private entity. Governments can pay for the infrastructure / technology over time versus
making a single large upfront investment.
The value of the P3 relationship is illustrated by the coordinated construction and
process of matching asset investments to the life cycle and asset renewal requirements. The
complete cost of providing, maintaining, and operating the asset is priced over the contract
term (typically 20‐60 years). When the asset is returned to the public entity at the end of the
period, the condition requirements set out in the contract must be complied with. The private
entity performs the support and delivery of services and secures the public entity financial
guarantees.

The Origination and Rise of the P3
The expansion to the west and development of the United States during the 19th
century created a need for a better transportation infrastructure. State and local government
had limited budgets along with limited experience. The success of Britain’s private turnpikes in
the 1600s to 1700s inspired American turnpike companies to build private roads in exchange
for land grants from state and federal governments. The public benefited from roads and
5
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railroads established on public land that were privately funded. The private companies
operated the roads efficiently and were willing to make further improvements that created a
cycle of economic development.4
The need for investment in overall U.S. infrastructure from 2010‐2020 was critical; yet
the expected public and private funding for projects during this period was insufficient to meet
the needs. During this time, it was estimated that investment needs for all types of
infrastructure reached $2.749 trillion, while expected funding was only projected to reach
$1.657 trillion per Figure 1. The surface transportation including roads and bridges is only 51
percent funded which is concerning. Highways and bridges are the backbone of the United
States transportation system and serve as the nation’s central artery of commerce and activity.
Motor vehicles traveling roads and bridges remain the primary mode of transportation in
America, accounting for 88 percent of person miles of travel (PMT).5 To compare, air travel
accounts for 8 percent of PMT, while buses and trains account for only 1 percent.6 The
Committee for Economic Development recommended that a greater private‐entity
participation in road building and maintenance is needed.7
The United States has been deferring maintenance and inadequately investing in the
road network. The problem occurred from prioritizing constructions of new roads and bridges
instead of fixing existing facilities. Forty‐three percent of the budget went to maintaining
existing roadways even though they made up of 99 percent of the overall road system but 50

4

McNichol, D. The United States: The World’s Largest Emerging P3 Market.
Geddes, R. and Madison, T. (2017). Fixing America’s Roads & Bridges. Committee for Economic Development.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
5
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percent of state transportation dollars went to new construction projects during 2004 and
2008 which constituted only 1 percent of the entire system.
Figure 1:8

Taxes would not cover the trillions of dollars in overdue maintenance and upgrades for
deteriorating public assets as tax raises are impractical for low‐income constituents who may
not benefit from the usage. Raising taxes could increase income inequality and may be
regressive in which low‐income households pay a higher share of their income than high‐
income households). To address the shortfall, ASCE stressed the need for more private‐entity
involvement, increased federal investment and the leveraging of state and local government
revenues.9 The operating savings gleaned from the P3 project translates into a potential
funding source for future capital projects or can be used in the General Fund for pension and

8
9

de Best, R. (2020). U.S. Investment for Infrastructure needs in 2010 with a forecast for 2020.
American Society of Civil Engineers. 2017 ASCE Infrastructure Report Card.
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health care obligations. The federal government and a large amount of states have recognized
the benefits of the P3 model with thirty‐one states passing legislation for P3 activity.10
The COVID‐19 pandemic has had a profound influence on state and local economies and
their budgets. P3s are likely to increase as a result due to the unique economic and political
strain from the ensuing recession. How the public entity operates and leverages the P3
partnership will define its success in serving communities.

Types of P3s
The structure of each P3 is tailored to the needs of the project. There are varying
degrees of complexity and risk allocation. There are two main components of a P3 model:
whether they are being used for major capital improvements (building new or upgrading
existing asset) or for operations or maintenance services. Figure 2 demonstrates the continuum
of private entity involvement among P3 procurement models.
Figure 2:11

10
11

NCSL. (2015). Public‐Private Partnerships for Transportation: A Toolkit for Legislators.
NCSL. (2015). Public‐Private Partnerships for Transportation: A Toolkit for Legislators.
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Displayed below is an in‐detail summary of delivery models considered during the P3 process:
O&M: Operations‐Maintenance
A public partner contracts with a private partner to operate and maintain the asset. The
public partner holds ownership and management of the asset.12
OMM: Operations‐Maintenance‐Management
A public partner contracts with a private partner to operate, maintain, and manage the
asset. The public partner retains ownership of the asset, with the private party investing its own
capital. Private investment is considered in relation to operations costs and potential savings
over the term of the contract. Longer contract terms allow for increased private investment
because there is more time to recover private investment.13
DBM: Design‐Build‐Maintain
A DBM is like a design/build project except the maintenance of the facility for some
period becomes the responsibility of the private entity partner. The public entity partner owns
and operates the asset.14
DBO: Design‐Build‐Operate
The private partner designs, builds, and operates the asset. Combining all three phases
into a DBO approach maintains continuity of private involvement and facilitates private‐entity
financing of public projects supported by user fees generated during the operations phase.15

12

Green, E. ABCS of P3s: Understanding the Basics of This Project Model. P3 Kentucky.
Ibid.
14
Green, E. ABCS of P3s: Understanding the Basics of This Project Model. P3 Kentucky.
15
Ibid.
13
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DBOM: Design‐Build‐Operate‐Maintain
The design‐build‐operate‐maintain model couples the design and construction
responsibilities of design‐build procurements with operations and maintenance. These project
components are procured from the private section in a single contract with financing secured
by the public entity. The public agency maintains ownership and retains a significant level of
oversight of the operations through terms defined in the contract.16
DBFOM: Design‐Build‐Finance‐Operate‐Maintain
The responsibilities for design, construction, finance, operations, and maintenance are
transferred to private entity partners. DBFOMs are partly or wholly financed by revenue
streams generated by the project mainly through tolls and user fees.17
BOT: Build‐Operate‐Transfer
The private partner builds a facility to the specifications agreed to by the public agency,
operates the facility for a specified period under a contract with the agency, then transfers the
asset to the agency at the end of the period.18
LDO/BDO: Lease‐Develop‐Operate or Build‐Develop‐Operate
The private party leases or buys an existing facility from a public agency; invests its own
capital to renovate, then operates it under a contract with the public agency.19

16

Ibid.
Ibid.
18
Green, E. ABCS of P3s: Understanding the Basics of This Project Model. P3 Kentucky.
19
Ibid.
17
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Advantages and Disadvantages
The advantages of the P3 models include the following:


Infrastructure costs are lower for the public entity. Involved in the reduction are
construction costs, overall life‐cycle costs, and funding the project (through revenue
streams such as tolls).



The outcome is usually designed with performance‐based specifications which includes
innovation, higher quality, and timely provision of public services.



Programs/services can be provided using long‐term payments without increasing taxes.
Governmental funds earmarked for the project can be reallocated in the budget.



The private entity absorbs the risk, responsibility, cost of operations and maintenance.20

The disadvantages of the P3 models include the following:


Agreements are long‐term and inflexible due to envisioning all events that can influence
the project start such as policies, geological conditions, permits, and political will.



Lower than expected usage resulting from user fees can negatively reflect future public
entity fiscal indicators via decrease in available revenue.



Market conditions and cost growth can change the project.



The P3 procurement process is longer than the traditional public procurement.

Although individual priorities and strategies might differ, the potential advantages of P3
agreements benefit states and cities. These improvements include reduced construction costs
through value engineering strategies, sped up project timelines, innovation, shifted risk,

20

Engel, E., Fischer, F., and Galetovic, A. (2013). The Basic Public Finance of Public‐Private Partnerships.
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reduced overall life‐cycle costs, improved technology, consolidated procurement, and improved
accountability.
This performance and financial risk alignment over the contract period ensure that the
expense of the life cycle is optimized. The transition of ownership to a private entity enables
municipalities to benefit from the experience of the private entity that maintains a significant
number of assets. The private entity can exploit its global supplier relationships during
construction to reduce equipment and product costs. The collaboration also allows for the
latest innovations that municipalities use.

Background
In the following sections, I examine different initiatives and facets of states and cities,
highlighting the role of public‐private partnerships in each project. Based on the topic of
developing best practices for successful public‐private partnerships, a descriptive and
qualitative type of research approach is appropriate. This is completed by verifying data and
fact finding with necessary interpretation.
Given the current expansive scope of public‐private partnerships in the United States,
the discussion is limited to select public‐private partnerships, which have enjoyed varying levels
of success and failures primarily in transit. The data is analyzed comparatively among each P3
project to see how it succeed or failed and the major themes contributing to the results. A
comprehensive treatment of public‐private partnerships in every aspect is beyond the scope of
this paper. Nevertheless, the following discussion identifies some of the most significant P3
projects to date.


New York: LaGuardia International Airport Central Terminal
12
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California: George Deukmejian Courthouse
Indiana: Interstate 69 Highway
Illinois: Chicago’s Parking Meters

Research Design
This paper focuses on each partnership beginning with the background information, the
wants and needs of the governmental organization, discussing the scenarios of the situations
that led to the P3 need, and the bidding and selection process. I talk about the financing
structure gleaned from published financial statements and transit authority contracts. A brief
on a risk analysis of who were allocated specific risk categories is displayed. For the successful
partnerships, I analyze what went right and what the parties did to ensure a beneficial contract
for both sides. In the unsuccessful partnerships, issues are reviewed specifically on what led to
the decline and dissolution of the agreement.
I also examine the benefits of the successful P3 projects and limitations of the failed P3
projects. Successful P3 projects included the community’s vision and input and effectively
communicated to all stakeholders. Failed P3 projects did not take in account of the longevity of
the lease or ironically, the fine print i.e.: Chicago had to pay the P3 for parking meters taken
offline for parades/road repairs. This negated any profit Chicago stood to earn from the P3
arrangement. The Chicago deal also infuriated stakeholders because the contract was pushed
through the mayor to the City Council at last minute without input from constituents.
The primary sources for this research were public records. The detailed time frame of
the process was provided by evaluating articles from newspapers. The concerns and
controversies related to these projects and the views and actions of the stakeholders were also
covered. Related city records, including contracts, financial reports, proposals for capital
13
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development, agendas for city councils, and feasibility studies are reviewed. The paper’s results
and recommendations of best practices help understand the public‐private relationship, to
build a framework that can be used elsewhere. The best practices are displayed on tables and
charts.
Using a qualitative method, I investigate data that seeks answers to my research
question of “In What Scenario Does a P3 Work Best?” and how to develop best practices for the
successful P3 partnership. The methods used to obtain data for the paper are necessary to
figure out processes that the successful P3 partnerships employed and what the unsuccessful
P3 partnerships failed to do. By choosing P3 projects that were frequently discussed in the
media and subsequently cities with transparent policies, I ensured that there are plenty of
research materials to examine.
The subject of this paper advances the topic to assure P3s will succeed as fiscal
circumstances facing state and local governments will not improve greatly over the next decade
due in part to the coronavirus pandemic. Infrastructure including roads and bridges are failing
or in a state of disrepair across the United States. Raising taxes for transportation projects
especially given the state of government funds would be a hard sell among politicians.
Transportation P3s could assist with offsetting the direct expense of repairing or improving
infrastructure across the nation.

Data
This section is devoted to the four P3 projects that I have selected with a review of what
each P3 arrangement includes. The successful partnerships are LaGuardia International Airport

14
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Central Terminal (New York City, NY) and George Deukmejian Courthouse (Long Beach, CA). The
unsuccessful partnerships are the Interstate 69 (Indiana) and Chicago Parking Meters (Illinois).

New York City, NY: LaGuardia International
Airport Central Terminal
TYPE: Design‐Build‐Finance‐Operate‐Maintain (DBFOM) with fixed price Design‐Build (DB)
component

RESOURCE/SERVICE:





New Central Terminal building
2 new concourses and taxiway system with a new parking garage connector
New Central Hall portal that connects with Terminal C and D, civil infrastructure
frontage road improvements
Total lease period: 35 years

TIMELINE: The project started in 2013 for the prequalification of selecting a P3 partner.
Financial close was achieved in late 2015. Construction commenced from late 2015 to 2020.
The terminal opened in June 2020 (within its planned opening date of 2020).

PARTNERS:
Public: Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ)
Private: LaGuardia Gateway Partners (LGP)

CONSTRUCTION:
Joint Venture: Skanska USA Building Inc., Skanska USA Civil Northeast Inc., and Walsh
Construction Company II, LLC
Capital Cost: $4.2 Billion USD
15
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WHY UTILIZE THE P3 MODEL:
Mainly serving domestic air travel markets in North America’s most congested airspace,
the LaGuardia Airport (LGA) is an important part of the New York region with a metropolitan
area of 19 million people. LGA plays an important function in transporting goods and people.
Since modern airline fleets are larger and deliver passenger loads that surpass the parameters
of the original terminal building, LGA has exceeded its capacity to service air traffic demand.
The expansion of LGA was part of the PANYNJ’s 10‐year capital investment plan for the
region’s ports, airports, bridges, and tunnels.21 The airport originally had a design capacity of 8
million air passengers annually. PANYNJ estimated that by 2030, LGA’s passenger traffic would
exceed 34 million passengers, with 17.5 million passengers annually in the Central Terminal
building alone.22 All facilities including restrooms, baggage handling areas, parking and utilities
were past their useful life and are not adequately sized for current and planned demand
growth.23 PANYNJ thought the project would be done quicker, that the P3 partnership could
bring technological solutions to alleviate challenges, and cost overruns risks could be the
private entity’s responsibility.24

PROCUREMENT:
Owing to the project’s size and scope, the procurement process took a while. The
PANYNJ released a request for qualifications (RQ) including a strategic lease deal that
positioned the public entity for future revenue sharing. The RQ had many proposed

21

Airport Advisory Panel. A 21st Century Airport for the State of New York: The New LaGuardia.
Vantage Airport Group. LaGuardia Terminal B Fact Sheet Project Overview.
23
Ibid.
24
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. May 28, 2015 Board Minutes.
22
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components with an assumed airline rate (to make it fair for airline competition), a fixed price
and financing plan, and a minimum $200M equity and $20M bid security. The requests
attracted 4 possible partners that met the criteria put forth by the RQ. PANYNJ ultimately chose
LaGuardia Gateway Partners due to their 20‐year experience in managing 9 airports around the
world. The private entity had a fully integrated team invested in long‐term partnerships with 19
airports being transitioned from public to private.25

FUNDING SOURCES:




$2.5B tax‐exempt bonds through New York Transportation Development Corp with LGP
as the borrower26
$1.5B funding from the PANYNJ27
$200M equity from LGP28

AGREEMENT:
LGP has the right to the 35‐year lease that allows them to develop, design, construct,
operate, and maintain the new Terminal B facilities and to charge, collect, and retain revenues
from the operation of such facilities until expiration of the lease term in December 2050.29
Figure 3 lists the structure of the special purpose vehicle which is the airport, and how it will be
structured in the P3 model with the Port Authority (PA) funding a portion for the project,
getting terminal lease payments back from the airport. LGP will generate revenues from
availability payments, landing and terminal fees paid by airlines, and payments made by goods
and services in the terminal itself under the concession contracts.30 The airlines will be paying

25

A Whole New LGA. The New LaGuardia Airport: Project Overview ACRP – Public‐Private Partnership Panel.
New York Transportation Development Corporation. Special Facilities Bonds, Series 2016A.
27
Vantage Airport Group. P3
28
Ibid.
29
RFQ‐31224. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. Request for Qualifications LaGuardia Airport.
30
Ibid.
26
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user fees to the airport and get the benefit of a well‐maintained airport in return. The private
investors and bond holders give/loan money and get profit/interest back.
Figure 3:31

Long Beach, CA: George Deukmejian Courthouse
TYPE: Design‐Build‐Finance‐Operate‐Maintain (DBFOM)
RESOURCE/SERVICE:






New Court facility with 31 courtrooms
Basement‐level secure parking, vehicle sallyport for secure inmate transfer, in‐
custody holding cells
Leasable office and retail space
Seismic upgrades
Total lease period: 35 years

TIMELINE: A RFQ was issued by the California Administrative Office of the Courts in 2008
followed by the financial closing in 2010. Design and construction were completed in 2013.

31

RFQ‐31224. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. Request for Qualifications LaGuardia Airport.
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PARTNERS:
Public: California Administrative Office of the Courts (CAOC)
Private: Long Beach Judicial Partners (LBJP) and Meridiam Infrastructure

CONSTRUCTION:
Joint Venture: Clark Design / Build of California
Capital Cost: $490 Million USD

WHY UTILIZE THE P3 MODEL:
Functionally and physically, the former Long Beach Courthouse was deficient. In terms
of safety and overcrowding, it was rated among the worst in the state of California. The 1959
era building, designed for a population of 344K, was therefore unable to meet the current
needs of the state and the increasing demand for court facilities in the area, now with a
population of 650K and growing.32 The CAOC wanted to use a delivery and operations method
that would allow the Judicial Branch to deliver a new building without creating debt.
California was actively looking for innovative ways to shift risk and capital requirements
due to the billions needed for courthouse repairs throughout the state. The P3 model afforded
Long Beach the opportunity to replace the infrastructure during the financial crisis in 2008
when financing was non‐existent among U.S. banks due to the subprime mortgage crisis.33

32

Puente, K. (2013 August 27). City’s new courthouse shines. Orange County Register.
Long Beach Press Telegram. (2016 May 28). Judges say high cost of Long Beach courthouse is depriving other
areas of courtrooms.
33
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PROCUREMENT:
Eleven bidders submitted qualifications and five were selected for the final round. The
finalists provided a comprehensive proposal to the CAOC. LBJP was selected based on its
partnership with Meridiam, a global asset manager of public and community infrastructure and
Clark Construction Group, one of the most experienced building and civil construction firms in
the United States.34

FUNDING SOURCES:



$441M in a 7‐year mini perm financing on a club loan basis that was refinanced
to a $519M 34‐ year bond after construction
$49M Meridiam and LBJP equity investment

AGREEMENT:
The courthouse was the first U.S. social infrastructure project outside of transportation
acquired under the principles of performance‐based infrastructure (PBI), which uses a public‐
private partnership not only to finance design and development, but also to provide long‐term
operations and maintenance. This strategy relieved the state of upfront expenses as payments
do not start until construction is completed.
For its part, LBJP will get an annual performance‐based service fee on the lease,
protected by the clause that the consortium can evict the state if availability payments are not
made. The monthly rate was subject to satisfactory maintenance and can be used to deduct for
any more than two‐hour lapses or closures that decrease building performance i.e.: elevator
shutdowns.35 This incentivizes LBJP to design the building for endurance and operations in the

34
35

Administrative Office of the Courts. Fact Sheet: Long Beach Judicial Partners.
Judicial Council of California. Report to the Judicial Council August 20, 2015.
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long‐term. The building was agreed to be turned back to the state at 85% of new condition in
35 years. LBJP will also get lease, parking, and retail revenues in the concession contract from
vendors.
Figure 4 lists the structure of the courthouse as a special purpose vehicle, and how it will
be structured in the P3 model with the CAOC paying the service fees in return for a well‐
maintained facility. The county will be leasing the courtrooms for their dockets. The private
investors and banks give/loan money and get profit/interest back.
Figure 4:36

Indiana: Interstate 69
TYPE: Design‐Build‐Finance‐Operate‐Maintain (DBFOM)

36

RFQ # OCCM 081105. California Courts: The Judicial Branch of California. Request for Qualifications for New Long
Beach Courthouse.
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RESOURCE/SERVICE:




Reconstruct and upgrade 21 miles of State Route 37 to U.S. interstate
regulations
Additional travel lanes and overpasses
Total lease period: 35 years

TIMELINE: A RFQ was issued by the Indiana Department of Transportation (IDOT) starting in
2013 with the expectation that the project would be completed by the end of 2016. IDOT
selected I‐69 Development Partners in 2014 as the concessionaire. The financial conditions of
Isolux Infrastructure Netherlands (the main owner of I‐69 Development Partners) and Corviam
Construcción caused multiple construction delays. As a result, the state requested a dissolution
of the P3 agreement in 2017.

PARTNERS:
Public: Indiana Department of Transportation (IDOT)
Private: I‐69 Development Partners (IDP): umbrella company for Isolux Infrastructure
Netherlands, Corviam Construcción, and Aztec Engineering

CONSTRUCTION:
Joint Venture: Corviam Construcción and Isolux Infrastructure Netherlands (which had no
experience building roads and bridges in the United States)37
Capital Cost: $568.4 Million USD

37

Alesia, M. & Lange, K. (2017 June 18). Mike Pence’s infrastructure mess: What went wrong with I‐69?
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WHY UTILIZE THE P3 MODEL:
The I‐69 project was needed to improve connectivity between Northern and Southern
Indiana and to complete the route from Canada to Mexico.38 IDOT wanted to deliver
transportation infrastructure faster than expected and at the lowest cost to taxpayers. A P3
model was selected due to the complexity of the interstate project and to transfer the risk to
the private company. An availability payment method was used to provide long‐term value and
the up‐front payment from IDP was used to offset transportation expenses of other Indiana
roadways.

PROCUREMENT:
The process took four weeks. IDP was chosen for its lowest bid (about $73M less than
the next lowest bid and $22M less than the state’s own estimate).39

FUNDING SOURCES:40






$243.6M private activity bonds (PAB)
$8M private activity bonds sale premiums
$115.8M equity
$108M from Indiana and the federal government
$93M Indiana Department of Transportation public entity funds

AGREEMENT:
I‐69’s contract relied on an availability payment model. IDP was responsible for offering
a mix of PAB debt and equity capital to fund development under the terms of the agreement. In
addition, if IDP met those construction milestones, IDOT was responsible for making a series of

38

National Highway System. FHWA Route Log and Finder List.
Alesia, M. & Lange, K. (2017 June 18). Mike Pence’s infrastructure mess: What went wrong with I‐69?
40
U.S. Department of Transportation. Federal Highway Administration. Project Profile: I‐69 Section 5.
39
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progress payments.41 Once done, IDOT would make regular payments for a period of 35 years
to IDP, known as availability payments.42 These payments will, in theory, allow IDP to repay PAB
bondholders; cover ongoing operations and maintenance costs; and provide equity investors
with a return. There were two clauses in the agreement that allowed the state to take charge
effectively if the project was not completed or delayed.43 To help offset the additional expense
of completing the project, IDOT included a $50M bonus payment.44 This payment would be
insured by insurance policies that IDP had to buy as part of the agreement.
Figure 5 lists the structure of I‐69 as a special purpose vehicle, and how it will be
structured in the P3 model with the IDOT allowing IDP to operate and maintain the roads for
availability payments of $560M.45 The investors and lenders give/loan money and get
profit/interest back. The road users get a well‐maintained road.
Figure 5:46

41

DeGood, K. (2018 February 15). When Public‐Private Partnerships Fail: A Look at Southern Indiana’s I‐69 Project.
Center for American Progress.
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid.
44
DeGood, K. (2018 February 15). When Public‐Private Partnerships Fail: A Look at Southern Indiana’s I‐69 Project.
Center for American Progress.
45
Indiana Finance Authority. I‐69 Section 5 Request for Qualifications.
46
Ibid.
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Chicago, Illinois: Parking Meters
TYPE: Operations, Maintenance, & Management (OMM)
RESOURCE/SERVICE:47





36,000 parking meters converted from single‐space coin operated meters to
electronic payment pay stations
Operations and maintenance of all parking meters along with management of all
parking meters
Installation of a 24‐hour customer service center to assist with refunds and
issues
Total lease period: 75 years

TIMELINE: Early 2008, the city of Chicago projected a budget shortfall of $500M for 2009. In
2008, the City Council voted to enter into an operating agreement for the parking meter system
with Chicago Parking Meters, LLC. Shortly thereafter, the coin meters were replaced with pay‐
and‐display boxes.

PARTNERS:
Public: City of Chicago (CC)
Private: Chicago Parking Meters, LLC (CPM) and Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners (MSIP)

OPERATION:
Upfront Payment: $1.157 Billion USD

WHY UTILIZE THE P3 MODEL:
The first P3 contract Chicago signed was in 2004 for leasing out the Chicago Skyway for
99 years. The $1.8 billion payment provided a large sum of money for future investments and

47
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helped the budget. In 2008, Chicago had a projected budget shortfall of $500M for 2009 which
caused the then mayor Richard Daley to seek out a P3 model to eradicate the budget deficit like
he did with the Chicago Skyway deal.48 Mayor Daley also wanted to establish a long‐term
reserve fund to replace revenue, retire debt, and shift risk.49 The deal fit their profile of assets
to long‐term transaction which could provide substantial financial benefit to taxpayers.
Additionally, Daley felt that Chicago could not efficiently manage the meters themselves.

PROCUREMENT:
In 2008, the city issued a RFQ for the lease on the parking meters. Ten responses were
recorded and six were qualified. Several months were spent negotiating and defining the length
of the lease with the potential vendors. The winning bid was the highest of all bids at $1.157B
from CPM. The mayor and CFO of Chicago pushed through the deal to the city council for a
quick vote on the 75‐year concession agreement.

FUNDING SOURCES:


$1.157B private note sale from MSIP

AGREEMENT:
For a one‐time up‐front lump sum of $1.157B, CPM would take over 34,500 on‐street
meters and 1,240 metered spaces in 18 city parking lots.50 CPM is required to provide metered
parking services to include the operation, management, maintenance, and collection of parking
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meter revenue. CPM must pay for all infrastructure upgrades, including the transfer of coin
meters to pay‐and‐display boxes accepting credit cards and cash.51 CPM will receive revenue
from metered payments. However, the Chicago Department of Revenue will get money from
ticketed vehicles.52
Under the agreement, Chicago can at its own discretion, add, delete, and transfer
meters and increase or lower meter prices.53 As long as Chicago’s system changes do not
impact the net percentage of COM’s total system activity, these changes are cost‐free; however
if there is a decline in the percentage of system in service (number of meters, their rates, and
hours of operation) the city will have to pay CPM the difference.54 To balance the missed
service, the city could extend hours of operation at existing meters, change rates, or add
meters.55
Figure 6 lists the structure of CPM as a special purpose vehicle, and how it will be
structured in the P3 model with Chicago leasing the meters to CPM and MSIP for a $1.157B
upfront payment. Chicago used the payment to replace revenue and retire debt. CPM would
get revenue through meter fees. The road users pay the parking meter fees and get well‐
maintained meters and service.
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Figure 6:56

Analysis
Permitting the privatizing of public goods has sparked a slew of philosophical debates
about the social, economic, and political ramifications.57 During the research for this paper, I
discovered that supporters of privatization often point to multiple productivity improvements
and performance results as a result of denationalization, while opponents pointed to many
failed privatization proposals where promised benefits were not realized or the cost of
privatization became high. Notwithstanding the persistent hostility toward any new
privatization and despite numerous cases of less or unsuccessful privatization, the P3
partnership still appears to be the most popular and viable public option available to many
governments today facing multiple challenges. These challenges include declining efficiency and
quality of government activities and not wanting to raise taxes to fund large‐scale infrastructure
improvements.
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A P3 partnership allows for increasing effectiveness of public services by sparing risks
and drawing from the experience of the private entity. It is not an easy procurement option for
the government, nor do they offer a universal solution. There is clear evidence about specific
advantages of the P3 model in terms of reducing the risks and enhancing the economic benefits
associated with large‐scale infrastructure investments. Successful P3 projects included the
community’s vision and input and effectively communicated to all stakeholders in addition to
sharing risks associated with the project. Failed P3 projects did not take in account of the
longevity of the lease or put too much risk on the private entity.
The P3s that were created consisted of three main reasons. First, the public entities
needed funds to replace or repair infrastructure or to shore up budget deficits. Second, the
public entities felt that they did not have the expertise or technology to improve efficiency and
quality of service for their constituents. Third, the public entities felt that the P3 model can
quickly change an outdated system and eliminate long‐term risks such as operating and capital
expenditures.
The P3 projects studied suggest that when the major risks are entirely allocated to one
side or the other: design, construction, and finance that the probability of financial difficulty
increases. Since revenue risk is the main risk in infrastructure projects, the secret to a successful
project is its proper risk allocation. The attempts observed to fully pass this risk to the private
entity have not been shown to be effective and led to either private partner bankruptcy (I‐69)
or an unexpected rise in the meter rate (Chicago Parking Meters). The more economically
stable models either share the revenue risk or keep the public entity accountable for revenue
differences (LaGuardia Airport Central Terminal and George Deukmejian Courthouse). The most
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significant concern is ensuring that the risk distribution is allocated to the parties that can
handle them. Since the revenue risk of civil infrastructure is scarcely ‘manageable” there is no
real benefit to allocate it to the private entity, whereas the private entity includes the price of
this risk in usage fees. If revenues are below the level needed to service the debt, the private
entity is not experienced in the technical aspects of the project, all the project risk is shifted to
the private partner, or financial problems plague the private partner to the point it has to file
for bankruptcy, the state has to take over like what happened with the I‐69 P3 project. The
private partner can enjoy elevated profit that may otherwise be used by the public company
when revenues are greater than projected. Not transitioning all the revenue risk to the private
partner ensures that outcomes are more economically secure because the private partner
would not need to restructure the agreement.

30

Developing Best Practices for Successful Public‐Private Partnerships

The P3 arrangement meant that LaGuardia Central Terminal could replace outdated
facilities, reduce traffic congestion, obtain a modern infrastructure all at a minimal public risk
and cost contribution. This successful P3 project was made possible by sharing financial risks in
which the private entity contributed more than $2B and the public entity contributed more
than $1B. Governor Andrew Cuomo saw through every step in the P3 project to ensure that it
succeeded. The Governor put together a seven‐member panel to come up with ways to
modernize LaGuardia Airport. The members consisted of educated and skilled individuals from
technology, planning, and economic development companies as well as including a Professor of
Urban Planning and advisor for New York State infrastructure. A high number of public and
private entity executives collaborated as a panel to put together a comprehensive vision for the
airport that took in account of its current and future needs. By focusing on future needs and
expanding the terminal to accommodate more people and bigger planes, they made it a highly
valuable public infrastructure that could withstand the growth in air transportation. The panel
made sure to include suggestions from the public by building a 3,000‐spot parking garage to
alleviate the congestion in neighborhood roads surrounding the airport. During construction,
the panel monitored all stages to make sure LGP kept to the schedule and requirements put
forth in the agreement.
The partners involved under the LGP umbrella were highly qualified and experienced.
Skanska, one of the partners, is a world leading green project development construction group
in Europe and the United States. Skanska renovated the United Nations Headquarters, the
World Trade Center transportation hub, and MetLife Stadium. They worked together with
public officials on the design of the terminal by elevating critical infrastructure such as
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substations and heating/refrigeration plants to prevent hurricane and storm damage since the
airport is on Flushing Bay.

The George Deukmejian Courthouse is another example of a successful P3 project. The
project was executed with a price‐certain contract and a strong commitment to the schedule.
By being a PBI, the courthouse had a fully integrated design process involving both the public
and private partners. A PBI agreement meant that the revenues due to LBJP could be reduced if
the courthouse failed to meet the performance requirements. The interior of the building had
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to be designed and built correctly to suit its users’ needs.58 The objective was to lower costs;
long‐lasting equipment and durable materials, while initially high, have lower life‐cycle costs
over the entire concession period. Cost‐benefit analysis was determined on every stage of the
courthouse build to either save money or improve a service. Both cost and quality were
examined. One example is using terrazzo flooring instead of carpet; this meant eliminating
costly frequent carpet replacement.59
LBJP obtained stakeholders’ feedback on the interior design and created a mock‐up trial
that included main interior courtroom fittings and furniture.60 The State Judicial Council,
Judges, court administration and the Sheriff were invited to test out the room. Their feedback
was used to refine the layout of the courthouse. By doing this, LBJP prevented costly mistakes
and time‐consuming corrections from occurring. The LBJP met all CAOC’s infrastructure goals
and completed the project earlier than scheduled.

(intended blank space)
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The I‐69 project was an unsuccessful P3. IDOT’s goal was to leverage their funding
appropriations to attract low‐cost private entity finances. The winning bid came from IDP which
bid the lowest, was $73M less than the next closest competing bid, and $22M less than the
state’s own cost estimate.61 IDOT did not conduct a thorough cost‐benefit analysis to determine
if IDP provided the best overall value. Additionally, it appears that they did not do their due
diligence in evaluating on whether to hire the company. IDP was a foreign entity that did not
have experience building roads and bridges in the U.S. The company’s executives were arrested
in Spain on embezzlement charges shortly after the P3 contract was signed.
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IDOT did not cancel the agreement which they could easily have done so since bonds
had not been floated yet to finance the work. Soon thereafter, IDP was marked the riskiest
company in the world and filed for bankruptcy. This led to IDP not paying the contractors so the
workers walked off site which meant construction would not be done on time.62 All of the risk
allocation especially the finances and construction were placed on the private entity. This
description of risk transference means that the government will always remain the guarantor of
the project delivery. IDOT was forced to take over the project delivery with delays and cost
overruns. They could have risked a harmful effect on future project financing with higher
interest rates on bonds because now investors lost trust in the government’s decision‐making
skills.
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Chicago’s parking meters P3 came at an excessive level of risk for the public entity and
consequently was an unsuccessful P3 model. The P3 deal resulted in significant adverse and
unpredictable financial consequences on public funds. Contributing factors to cost escalation
include having flawed risk reduction mechanisms embedded in the contract. This resulted in the
city absorbing new costs and risks that negatively impacted city finances. A provision in the
agreement was that CPM can bill the city for true‐up payments to make up lost profit for the
city taking parking meters offline for parades and road construction. The city estimated $506M
in true up obligations for 2020 and averaged $27M in true‐up payments to CPM since the P3
deal was finalized.63 This negated any profit Chicago stood to earn from the P3 arrangement.
The Chicago deal also infuriated stakeholders because the contract was pushed through the
mayor to the City Council at last minute without input from constituents.
Another issue was that Chicago will be stuck with a congested, outmoded street system
until 2083, when the deal expires. The P3 agreement required Chicago to maintain a costly
supply of on‐street parking while other cities are starting to look into biking lanes and
increasing public modes of transportation such as busses and subways along with ride sharing
programs such as Uber and Lyft. Additionally, the P3 model was analyzed by other cities. It was
found that the investors will recoup the entire $1.157B investment in 13 years of the deal
leaving them with 62 further years of pure profit.64 One lesser known provision is that Chicago
has to pay the difference in inflation if the parking meters do not bring in revenues at any given
year.65 For example, let’s say the parking system was worth $100M last year and the consumer
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price index rises by 2% which means the parking system is now worth $102M. Chicago needs to
pay CPM $2M or the parking meters need to bring in that much more. As a result, Chicago had
to increase the meter rates.
I‐69 and Chicago’s parking meters used a single‐sided distribution of risk and
management while a hybrid approach was used by LaGuardia Airport and George Deukmejian
Courthouse. By comparing the two groups, I learned that all in the first group had financial
difficulties and a lack of public review/participation of the P3 agreement, while those in the
second group had not. Where the risk should be placed on the group best prepared to handle
it, research showed much better results. The terms of the LaGuardia Airport and courthouse
agreement stated that significant risks are to be shared in a true economic relationship
between the public and private entity.
The next page contains a heat map which which represents the resulting qualitative
evaluation of the probability of risk occurrence and the impact on the entity if a particular risk
was experienced. The heat map is a great tool for visualizing complex statistical data. In this
case, the values were represented by light blue (not applicable risk), light orange (shared risk),
salmon (public risk), and red (private risk). The heat map shows in a visual way which entity gets
responsibility of each risk category to assimilate and detect the typical behavior in each P3
partnership. Further the heat map presents different types of risk in a way that makes
immediate sense by assigning different color to cells each representing a row providing for a
literal sense in showcasing P3 risk.
The heat map demonstrates that in the two successful P3 partnerships (LaGuardia
Airport Central Terminal and George Deukmejian Courthouse) the public and private entities
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have shared the financial, construction, and operations and maintenance portion of the P3
partnership as denoted by the light orange color. In the unsuccessful P3 partnerships (I‐69 and
Chicago Parking Meters) the financial, construction, and operations and maintenance risk
portion were assumed by the private entity as denoted in red color to refer to it as the most
riskiest.
To have a successful public‐private partnership, optimal risk allocation must be achieved
and accepted by the party best able to handle them. Throughout the paper, it has been stated
that the private entity did not have the ability to handle the finances, construction, and
operations and maintenance portions themselves hence using the red color as a warning.
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Best Practices
This section recommends best practices based on the research conducted to assure that
the P3 mitigate overruns and avoid delays.

 Have a good understanding of debt/equity structures and specialized
development team.
The ultimate responsibility for the success or failure of a P3 falls on government officials
according to David M. Lick, a lawyer with over than 40 years of experience in public‐
private partnerships.66 Members with special expertise and covering several disciplines
in serving the public entity should be part of the team.67 Private entities have the
experience and expertise in negotiating P3 contracts so it is imperative that the public
entity hire one or more consultants to match the abilities of the private entity, identify
strengths and weaknesses, and to develop the partnership.68 A consultant can help craft
the RFQ and RFP language that can protect the public’s interest and serve as a sounding
board throughout the entire process. The RFQ and RFP will help eliminate weak
proposals and ensure the remaining proposals can complete the project. Members must
also understand standard P3 terms and contract structures, including the rationale
behind the terms and structures.69 The development team must thoroughly vet bidders
and their work history to ensure that they can perform the requirements of the contract
and are able to secure funding without issues. Financing is a key consideration in every
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P3 project and to establish a plan that optimizes cost and efficiently allocates risks and
rewards is important.70 This will result in project commitments aligned with the strategy
of the public entity. Lick recommends using an annual performance review of the
private entity’s operations, zero‐sum reverter clauses (that allows the public entity to
possession of outsourced facilities if a breach of contract occurred), and performance
bonds or letter of credits.71

 Identify performance metrics and benchmarks.
The public entity must adopt standardized procurement practices and the procurement
process must be explicitly accountable and transparent. The development team needs
to consider the availability of performance data from comparable projects that the
private entity completed versus similar other public entity projects. A lack of clarity
about decision‐making and project governance hampers effective project execution. The
inefficient project execution issue can be overcome by requiring the public entity to
record and negotiate performance metrics, risk allocation processes, obligations, and
penalties in a feasible way. It is essential that the outcome‐based performance
specification is used; this way the private entity has the freedom to how achieve the
standard rather than having it specified by the public partner’s specifications. This truly
allows innovative solutions while providing the public with the assurance that their
requirements are met.
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 Analyze cost‐benefits for overall value.
To guarantee a positive cost/benefit balance, the overall cost must be analyzed. The
public entity needs to assess possible P3 agreements by comparing the cost of
traditional procurement to the P3 offer. If the public entity overestimates the risk and
underestimates the revenue potential of the project, as with Chicago, the private entity
makes a profit. The long‐term overall cost of ownership including O&M, can enable the
private entity not to optimize the minimum capital needed, but to optimize the initial
capital expenditure and the ongoing operating expenditure that actually maximizes the
value.

 Transparency for all involved.
There must be a reconciliation of both the public and private entity’s purposes and
agendas in making sure the P3 project succeeds. Having multiple meetings and
engagement can provide deeper talks on project specifications, potential savings,
following compliance obligations, and avoiding failure. It is beneficial to have a
partnership that will approach mediation, arbitration and disputes and resolve them
efficiently and professionally as discussed by Lick. This enhances collaboration and
increase successful outcomes.

 Allocate risks appropriately and equally.
It is important to enact a careful financial review of the P3 project to share the risk
between the public and private entity. The public entity typically pass risks to a private
entity, such as the likelihood of higher construction costs or lower than expected
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revenue. However, the responsibility of risks should be allocated to the highly capable and
well‐resourced teams incentivized to perform through the negotiated contract terms. Sharing
revenue risk can ensure that the private entity can manage the underlying risk drivers of traffic
and revenue stream (economic conditions or demographic trends) and avoid charging a
premium for the risk. This stops the inevitable higher price or lower concession fee for the
public entity and reduction of societal value of the infrastructure.

 Performance payments instead of a lump sum upfront payment.
By providing milestone payments instead of a lump sum upfront payment ensures that
the private entity will complete the project phases on time. The payments provide a
long‐term incentive for assets to be properly maintained. The case with Chicago is that
the public entity took upfront payments in exchange for long‐term leases that gave the
private entity the ability to collect parking meters for decades. Sacrificing secure, long‐
term income for an one‐time payment used to finance short‐term needs is fiscally
imprudent.

 Include shorter leases with termination clauses and avoid non‐compete
and stabilization clauses.
Long leases can prevent the public entity from meeting future transportation or
planning needs. Chicago’s 75‐year parking meter lease made it cost prohibitive for them
from changing out existing roads for bike lanes. Chicago incurs costs known as “true up”
payments whenever parking meters are out of service/removed. Long‐term deals can
also constrain lawmakers’ policymaking options for decades. A termination clause can
protect public and private entities if performance or revenue goals are not met. Both
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sides will need to ensure the termination clause covers any type of default with defined
circumstances addressed. Roads might need to be expanded to alleviate congestion but
non‐compete clause can prevent it from happening. Stabilization clauses could also
restrict the public entity from taking action that could reduce the private entity’s
revenue. Long‐term leases, non‐compete, and stabilization clauses can end up costing
the public entity more than it anticipates if it must renegotiate a deal due to disputes
over control.

 Monitor every stage in the process.
Several members of the development team who have the requisite credentials must be
given roles: dedicated project manager, financial analyst, and legal team. Their role is to
make sure everything is documented and monitored due to the many parties and
elements involved. To recognize, handle, and minimize deviations from the project, the
members can deploy project‐wide systems and resources resulting in better contingency
planning and quicker response to changes. The outcome is a greater alignment of public
and private priorities, higher efficiencies, incentives, and progress if the agreement is
kept by both sides and each stage of the P3 project is pursued.

Conclusion
In conclusion, the P3 process was discussed and analyzed based on whether the model
can be successful in the United States or not. The P3 model may be a response to the general
state of aging infrastructure that needs to be replaced when funds from the state and local
government are being diverted for more urgent budget needs, such as pensions and healthcare.
Inadequate infrastructure has a negative impact as it prevents efficient use of highways,
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bridges, and other resources critical to an efficient and expanding economy. Due to the
coronavirus pandemic, budgetary conditions facing state and local governments are not
expected to change significantly, so it is necessary to recognize the P3 model’s ability to provide
public services.
Four examples of high‐profile P3 projects were discussed thoroughly in this paper from
the timeline of the process to the wants and needs of the governmental organization,
discussing the scenarios of the situations that led to the P3 need, and the bidding and selection
process. The financing structure was also reviewed. For the successful partnerships, I identified
what went right and what the parties did to ensure a beneficial contract for both sides. In the
unsuccessful partnerships, I named issues that led to the decline and or dissolution of the
agreement.
There are several considerations that are important concerning the use of private
financing versus traditional public sector tax‐exempt financing. The private entity can help fast
track projects when public funding/financing is not available or insufficient. The P3 model may
allow some projects to be delivered with no effect on the public entity’s debt capacity.
The benefits outweigh the risks of the P3 model as this concept enhances government
accountability while protecting citizens from higher taxes and wasteful public spending. The
innovative technical private sector can bring the value of beneficial modernized long‐term
lasting life cycles to public assets. The P3 model, when held to specific metrics, can stay on
budget, time, and lower the cost of infrastructure. A P3 project can leverage advanced
technology and innovation to bring greater efficiency to the infrastructure.
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Hidden risks are always a potential in a P3 partnership. In particular, if there is a non‐
compete clause in the agreement for a revenue‐generating infrastructure that relies on user
fees or tolls, the public entity will be required to make up the difference if the P3’s toll revenue
falls after infrastructure is built. This unforeseen and unanticipated risk can increase costs.
There are many other unexpected risks: design, construction, availability, demand, and
financing risks that can disrupt the P3 project’s success. There is a fear that private entities may
cut corners in the operations and maintenance of the P3 project. However, a well‐structured P3
contract will contractually obligate the private entity to meet operating standards that define
limits for the asset condition and design, standards in cleanliness and safety along with incident
detection and response. The private entity must abide by these requirements or risk financial
penalties or termination of the P3 agreement and loss of investment. However, when following
the best practices outlined above, the public entity must be involved in every stage of the
project to prevent surprises and self‐advocate for their constituents by way of generating
efficiency.
Ultimately, a successful public‐private partnership can provide improved services to
more people and at a lower cost than either organization working alone.72 Implementing a
competitive procurement and risk sharing approach, the access to equity investment allows the
P3 partnership to potentially leverage a significantly greater amount of up front capital than a
public‐financed approach under equivalent or comparable project scope and assumptions.
Based on my research, I recommend the P3 model if best practices are followed because
it will bring a successful P3 partnership. It is important to apply competently and in the right manner
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the best practices because the P3 model allows public government the ability to create solutions that
can differentiate their state/city.
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